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BY DAVID HILL 
"If people don't come out to the ballpark, 
nobody's gonna stop them" 
.. . Yogi Bera 
he 2000 presidential election was one of the most remarkable 
elections in the history of the United States. The election was 
decided by 53 7 votes, the margin of victory (disputed of 
course) in the state of Florida. In fact, the outcome of the 
election was not known until 36 days later when the Supreme 
Court ruled in Bush v. Gore that vote totals certified by the 
Florida Secretary of State were, in effect, final. In reality, we 
will never know with certainty which candidate actually won 
the election. George Bush won the Electoral College by two 
votes based upon the disputed Florida vote, and Al Gore won 
the popular vote by roughly 550,000 votes (one-half of one 
percent), which is simply too close to call. One can be sure 
that the inadequacies of the Florida electoral system exist in 
almost all states (30,000 votes on ballot initiatives were ini-
tially overlooked in Boston and a substantial proportion of 
under and overvotes have now been identified in Chicago). 
Because of this, all we can really say with confidence about 
the election is that it was a dead heat. 
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One aspect of the election, however, was remarkably simi-
lar to past elections. As with every presidential election since 
1972 only about half of the eligible citizens actually cast a 
ballot. While final vote totals have yet to be confirmed by 
the Federal Election Commission, most estimates indicate 
turnout nationwide was somewhere between 50 and 52%, 
which is a modest increase over the 49% rate in 1996 (the 
lowest since 1924) . While turnout indeed increased, this by 
no means suggests American democracy is on the mend. 
2000 is simply another in a long line of low turnout elections 
since 1972. Given the closeness of the election, the low 
turnout is surprising. With so much in the balance and the 
intense focus of the media on the closeness of the election 
one would expect citizens to show up and participate in 
order to make a difference. Once again, however, students 
of political participation are left asking, why is turnout in 
American elections so low? 
In order to understand participation rates in the United 
States one must compare our turnout with that of other 
comparable democracies (See Figure 1) . Between 1960 and 
1995 turnout in 24 democracies without mandatory voting 
averaged 80% . Ten of these 24 states had turnout rates rang-
ing between 85% and 90%. Turnout in the United States 
over the same period, on the other hand, averaged 54% 
(in American midterm elections the average turnout rate 
is below 40%). Clearly, American turnout is very low when 
compared to other industrialized democracies. Why? 
Average Turnout In Selected Countries, 1960-1995 
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Figure J 
As we teach our students, gaining understanding of a com-
plex world requires complex answers. The low turnout in 
American elections cannot be explained with one powerful 
variable that can then be manipulated to rectify the problem. 
Much of the answer instead lies in the structure and nature 
of American government and electoral politics. Rather than 
creating an environment conducive to participation, the 
institutional arrangements that govern participation, repre-
sentation, and actual governance create an environment that 
discourages widespread participation. 
For instance, one of the central differences in electoral par-
ticipation between the United States and other industrialized 
democracies is that we make registering to vote voluntary. 
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If an individual wishes to vote in an election, that citizen 
must first place his or her name on the list of registered vot-
ers. Contrast this to the system of automatic registration used 
in almost all-European democracies in which the citizen's 
name is automatically placed on the voter list upon reaching 
voting age. In effect, we increase the costs of participation by 
adding the registration requirement and thereby making the 
relatively simple of act of voting a two-step process. 
The individual registration requirement has a particularly 
strong impact on those least likely to participate such as the 
young and those oflower socio-economic status. With the 
responsibility for registration placed on the individual those 
most likely to participate (higher levels of education, income, 
and older individuals) are the ones most likely to register to 
vote. These individuals place their names on the registratiDn 
rolls because they want to vote. Individuals who may lack 
resources or attitudes conducive to participation (or both) 
have very little ability or incentive to overcome the obstacle 
of registration. When election time comes around individu-
als who are registered are allowed to vote while the unregis-
tered are not. This is in part why the voting population in the 
United States is skewed toward the middle and upper classes 
and older Americans. 
Most students of participation agree that the implementa-
tion of automatic registration in the United States would 
increase overall turnout by approximately ten percentage 
points, while also modestly reducing the skew toward the 
advantaged. However, reform of this magnitude would 
still leave turnout as much as 16 points lower than the 
average turnout in other democracies. While restrictive 
registration requirements are a significant depressant of 
turnout they cannot completely explain the lower turnout. 
We must therefore look for other factors that can help 
explain the difference. 
The nature of tl1e party system in the United States also 
works to constrain participation. One of the key differences 
in the political system of the United States and other indus-
trialized democracies is that the United States is a two-party 
system in its purest form. On Election Day, American citizens 
have a choice between two centrist parties with a legitimate 
chance to gain a place in government. Contrast this to 
nations with proportional representation systems in which 
voters usually have a choice between several parties with a 
legitimate chance to gain seats in tl1e legislative body. In the 
United States individuals whose ideological preferences lie to 
tl1e left or right must either choose the party closest to their 
preferences (as many do) or not vote at all. While to some 
voting may be a habit or a reaffirmation of the political sys-
tem, most citizens cast a ballot in an election hoping to gain 
a voice in the government. In a two-party system like the 
United States many individuals see very few differences 
between the two major parties and simply cannot make a 
choice between what some have characterized as two sides of 
the same coin. Faced with this dilemma many citizens simply 
choose to abstain from voting altogether. 
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The two-party system in the United States is a natural 
function of the structures of American electoral politics. The 
United States' electoral system is based on single-member, 
winner-take-all districts, which means that our system of 
representation is based on one representative per geographic 
district. In any single-member district election the winner 
of the election gets to participate in government, and the los-
ing side must wait until anotl1er day. This type of electoral 
system tends to suppress the formation of minor parties for 
two main reasons. First, rather than expend valuable political 
resources on fighting a losing battle, most politicians will join 
one of the two main parties closest to their policy prefer-
ences. Second, citizens seeking a voice in government do not 
wish to expend their valuable vote (they only have one) on a 
losing candidate so they too choose the major party closest to 
their policy preferences rather than cast a ballot for a minor 
party. Thus, the structure of electoral politics (i.e. single 
member districts) constrains the number of choices voters 
have at the polling place. 
Single-member districts also shape mobilization efforts 
by the parties and their candidates. This is important because 
when the parties and their candidates expend resources to 
reach out to voters they make the act of voting easier tl1rough 
increased visibility, the provision of information, or even a 
ride to the voting precinct. More importantly when a party 
or candidate contacts a citizen or reaches out to a particular 
group they are telling citizens "your vote matters." As one 
political scientist has argued: "people will vote when they 
are asked." 
The problem lies in tl1e fact that strategic candidates 
(those that seek to maximize their chances of winning) must 
expend their resources where they will have the most effect 
and that is in competitive races. Thus, in competitive elec-
tions the parties and candidates expend resources reaching 
out to potential voters in an attempt to win. In non-competi-
tive races, on the other hand, voters are left to their own 
devices to make sense of the campaign and to participate. 
Across the nation, tl1en, our single-member district elections 
tend to produce uneven mobilization efforts leaving many 
citizens behind. 
A good example of how single-member districts influence 
mobilization efforts is the Electoral College. All states, with 
the exceptions of Maine and Nebraska, award all of their 
electoral votes to the winner of the presidential contest in 
the state, and thus candidates must focus on building an 
Electoral College majority by winning enough states to reach 
the required 270 votes needed to win the presidency. Some 
have argued that the strength of the Electoral College is that it 
forces the candidates to pay attention to small states because 
they may need one or a few of these states to win. The logic 
behind this is very strong. For instance, by simply giving New 
Hampshire to Gore rather than Bush, the outcome of the 
election would be different. This argument, while logical, 
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ignores the fundamental premise of campaigning. Use your 
resources where they are needed most, which as mentioned is 
in the most competitive electoral contexts. Candidates may 
focus on a small state if that state is highly competitive but 
only when such an effort does not detract from campaigning 
in a larger state which is also competitive. After all, where 
does it make sense to spend money: in Maine, which is com-
petitive and has four electoral votes, or Florida, which is com-
petitive and has 25 electoral votes? In the end, the name of 
the game is winning 270 electoral votes and the candidates 
will not expend resources to win a handful of electoral votes. 
They simply have no incentive to visit or spend money in 
those states that do not have much to offer in the way of 
electoral votes. 
A brief analysis of campaign visits to states by the two 
major campaigns provides an example of how the Electoral 
College forces the two major campaigns to focus on the most 
competitive states. For instance, in the 2000 campaign 15 
states were not visited at all by the presidential and vice-presi-
dential candidates of the two major parties. Not surprisingly, 
the average number of electoral votes for these states is a little 
less than six. The two major campaign organizations had no 
incentive to expend resources visiting states that provided lit-
tle in the way of building an Electoral College majority. This 
is not to say within this environment that the candidates will 
focus their energy completely on those states with the most 
electoral votes. New York and Texas, for example, have the 2"d 
and 3'd most Electoral College votes respectively, yet neither 
state received any serious attention from the two major 
campaigns because they were not competitive. Where tl1e 
campaigns did focus their energy and resources was in the 
most competitive states. For example, between Labor Day 
and Election Day (November 7) there were 264 total cam-
paign visits to 35 states (and the District of Columbia) by 
the two major presidential campaigns. Of tl1ese 264 visits 
208, or 79%, were to the 16 so-called battleground states 
(ilie most competitive). (See Figure 2) Clearly, the two major 
campaigns were focusing their energy and resources where 
they could help iliem the most in attempting to win tl1e 
White House. 
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If mobilization matters in increasing turnout we would 
expect turnout to be higher in the battleground states 
because of the greater mobilization attempts on tl1e part of 
the major campaigns. (See Figure 3). The average of turnout 








in battleground states this past election was 56%. In non-
battleground the average level of turnout was 51 %. In fact, 
turnout in the 16 battleground states increased from 53% in 
1996 to 56% in 2000, while in the non-battleground states 
turnout remained unchanged between these two elections. 
It appears that ilie intense attention paid to the battleground 
states by the two major campaigns resulted in higher levels 
of turnout. 
The point here is iliat the Electoral College, a constitution-
ally mandated feature of the American political system, 
creates an electoral context in which politicians are forced 
to focus their resources where iliey will do the most good, 
and citizens in the rest of the country are left to fend for 
themselves. Voting is much more likely when everyday 
people are aware of where the candidates stand. In the sixteen 
battleground states one can hazard a guess to say any 
citizen who was marginally engaged with the political world 
was at least minimally aware of where Bush and Gore stood, 
or they were at least exposed (relentlessly) to campaign ads 
and mailings. Citizens in the remaining 34 states (and the 
District of Columbia) were left to their own devices to deci-
pher where ilie candidates stood and, as would be expected, 
turnout was lower. 
The final institutional culprit responsible for contributing 
to tl1e low turnout rates in the United States is the central 
feature of the structure of government created by the Consti-
tution: the separation of powers. The notion that the govern-
ment should be divided into three individual branches 
(legislative, executive, and judicial) has a long philosophical 
history and is, in fact, deeply ingrained into the American 
psyche. Most states mandate that college students take gov-
ernment courses developed around iliis structure and many 
citizens equate this form of government with democracy 
itself. The key argument in support of ilie separation of pow-
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making. And indeed, across the history of our nation, with 
the exception of the Civil War, the constitutional arrange-
ments have provided political stability. 
Unfortunately, a by-product of this stability is a fragmenta-
tion of power and the blurring of accountability. Citizens 
tend to cast ballots in an election in order choose leaders who 
will then pursue some broad ideological agenda or at least 
policy preferences similar to their own. In a sense citizens 
vote because they want a say in governmental outputs. In 
nations where the main policymaking power is divided 
between the legislative and executive branches there is a 
reduction in the ability of the government to produce sub-
stantive policy and also a reduction in the ability of citizens 
to either assess credit or blame for governmental outputs. A 
citizen's inability to clearly determine what the government 
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has produced creates the perception that elections have very 
little chance of affecting policy outputs. Thus many citizens 
drop out of the political arena because they come to believe 
that elections simply don't matter. In fact, across 29 democra-
cies turnout is lower in those countries with separation of 
powers systems than those with parliamentary systems. 
Further, one of the enduring characteristics of the 
American political system in the post-war era is divided 
government in which control of the legislative and executive 
branch is divided between the Democratic and Republican 
parties. In these periods (34 of the last 48 years) policy is even 
more difficult to craft, accountability is completely blurred 
and many citizens are left angry and confused. Across time, 
then, turnout should decrease during these periods as many 
citizens come to believe that their vote doesn't matter because 
government has not dealt with the problems facing the 
nation . One scholar has estimated that since 1840 for every 
presidential election held under divided government (this 
means four previous years of divided control), there is on 
average a 2% decrease in turnout. We may gain stability 
tl1rough the separation of powers, but we do so at the 
expense of widespread participation. 
BRIDGEWATER ~EVIEW 
The question of why turnout is so low in American elec-
tions is fairly easy to answer. The institutional arrangements 
(electoral and governmental) in our nation create an envi-
ronment which is not conducive to widespread participation. 
For those who believe that increased participation in elec-
toral politics is a worthwhile goal, the central question then, 
is how do we increase turnout in the United States? 
Without a complete restructuring of the constitutional 
arrangements of governmental and electoral politics, single-
member districts, the Electoral College, and the separation of 
powers will be with us for some time to come. Given the diffi-
culty of changing institutional structures, we are left with 
reforming tl1e laws that regulate citizen access to the voting 
booth, such as registration requirements at the state level. 
Many states have experimented with various reforms aimed 
at increasing participation in elections. North Dakota for 
instance comes closest to automatic registration with no 
registration requirement at all. On Election Day citizens 
can simply show up and vote. Six states (Idaho, Maine, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) 
have election-day registration, in which citizens wishing to 
cast a ballot in an election can show up at the polling place 
and register before they vote. With registration systems that 
are very accessible these seven states have turnout rates 
substantially higher than the rest of the nation . Since 1980 
average turnout in these states is 10 points higher than states 
with more restrictive registration systems. 
The success of election-day registration is fairly easy to 
explain. In states without election-day registration, citizens 
must place their name on the registration list a specified 
period of time prior to the election. Most states have a thirty-
day "closing date" (Massachusetts is twenty days) after which 
citizens are not allowed to register and thus not allowed to 
vote. Closing dates can have a depressive effect on turnout 
because the height of intensity and publicity of a campaign 
takes place during the last thirty days prior to the election. In 
those states with long closing dates, then, the state is cutting 
off access to the voting booth just as the campaign has the 
greatest potential to mobilize potential voters. Contrast this 
to election-day states (and North Dakota) in which citizens 
can simply show up on Election Day to register and cast a 
ballot. The opportunity to register on Election Day can have 
a particularly strong effect on marginal voters who may not 
become engaged with the campaign until the last couple of 
weeks prior to the election. In election-day states a citizen 
mobilized by tl1e politicized environment of the campaign 
can simply show up, register, and vote. If we want to increase 
turnout in American elections implementing election-day 
registration on a national scale is simply the easiest and most 
effective way to do this. In fact, the reform has been proposed 
to Congress several times since 1978, but each time it has 
been defeated. 
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The most well known registration reform in recent years is 
the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) more com-
monly known as "motor voter." The reform is a federal man-
date that requires all states without election-day registration 
(or North Dakota) to allow citizens to register to vote (or 
update their registration) at drivers license bureaus, through 
the mail, or at public agencies such as AFDC, disability, or 
unemployment offices. The logic of the reform is fairly 
straightforward. By placing the opportunity to register in 
front of as many people as possible, the registered electorate 
should expand and by extension overall turnout rates should 
increase. Since the implementation of the law in 1995 the 
registered electorate has expanded, and it appears the pro-
portion of individuals from low participation groups such 
as the young, the poor, and racial minorities has increased 
among the registered electorate. In the two elections since, 
however, ( 1996 and 1998; the 2000 election data are not yet 
available) it does not appear that individuals who are regis-
tering via the reform are voting once registered. 
As mentioned, voting in the United States is a two step 
process in which the potential voter is required to register 
before he or she is allowed to vote in an election. The NVRA 
addresses the first step in the process and at this point 
appears to have been successful at creating a more represen-
tative registered electorate. However, the reform does noth-
ing to motivate the newly registered citizen to vote in the next 
election. Whatever individual level obstacles, such as socio-
economic resources or personal attitudes, that existed prior 
to registration still stand between the citizen and the voting 
booth. The NVRA is a positive step in the direction of creat-
ing a more equitable electoral politics; however registration 
reforms such as the NVRA only open the door to the voting 
booth a little wider. They do nothing to help the person 
through that door. 
There are other reforms aimed at increasing participation 
either being implemented or at least part of the reform 
debate. For instance, Oregon conducted the 2000 election 
completely through the mail, and Arizona ran a limited 
experiment with Internet voting in 2000. Some have argued 
that by making election-day a holiday (or at least combining 
it with an existing holiday such as Veteran's Day) we can 
increase turnout because 1) people will have time to vote, and 
2) it would make choosing our government a celebration 
rather than something we do the first Tuesday after the first 
Monday in November. Another reform with some merit is 
the suggestion that we hold elections over the course of a 
weekend. This way citizens can vote at their convenience 
rather than having to squeeze it into their busy schedules 
between specific hours on a particular day. 
BRID G EWATER REVIEW 
While the impact of any reform aimed at making registra-
tion and voting easier is likely to be limited due to the institu-
tional constraints inherent to the American system, they are 
nonetheless worthwhile efforts at creating a healthier democ-
racy through widespread participation. Some have argued 
that government works best when only the most informed 
and engaged citizens participate in the political process. 
Indeed, the structures of government in the United States 
are based on the belief that widespread participation should 
be limited to prevent tyranny imposed by an uniformed 
majority. There is another side to this debate, however. 
Participation is a matter of voice, or having a true say in the 
choosing of governmental leaders who may craft policy 
which has a dramatic impact upon your life. Widespread par-
ticipation creates greater democratic legitimacy because all 
groups in the polity have a say in choosing elected officials. 
The presidential election of 2000 was one of the most 
remarkable elections in the history of this nation. However, 
when we clear away media hype surrounding lawyers, pun-
dits, and state and federal Supreme Court rulings we are left 
with an election in which a little more than half of the eligible 
voting population cast ballots. Are the citizens of the United 
States that much more lazy and ignorant than citizens in 
other nations? Most comparative public opinion work sug-
gests An1ericans are as engaged and knowledgeable (if not 
more so) than citizens in other industrialized democracies. 
Is the problem, as Jim Hightower put it, that the 2000 elec-
tion was a choice between "Miller Lite and Bud Lite .. . either 
way you end up with mighty weak beer?" The lack of sub-
stantive differences between the two major parties is certainly 
a good part of the turnout problem; however, this is only a 
symptom of a larger problem. What I have tried to do here is 
place American turnout in a larger perspective. Electoral 
politics takes place within an institutional context and in the 
United States the institutions that govern our electoral and 
governmental politics work to depress participation in elec-
tions. Will turnout in American elections ever reach that of 
European elections? No, not as long as the current rules of 
the game are in place. Can electoral politics in the United 
States be improved? Certainly, all of the reforms discussed 
here are positive steps toward creating a more inclusive 
democracy in which citizens come to believe they have true 
voice in government. 
David Hill is Assistant Professor of Political Science. 
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